Henry Hayward v. J. R. Downing and J. Wayne Eldredge and Lynn D. Wright v. J. R. Downing and J. Wayne Eldredge : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1948
Henry Hayward v. J. R. Downing and J. Wayne
Eldredge and Lynn D. Wright v. J. R. Downing and
J. Wayne Eldredge : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin & Richards; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hayward v. Downing, No. 7216 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/946
Case No. 7216 
Case No. 7217 
In the Supren1e Court 
of the State of Utah 
HENRY HAY"\VARD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. R. DOWNING and J. \VAYNE 
ELDREDGE, 
Defendamts and AppeUants, 
and 
LYNN D. WRIGHT, a Minor, by JESSE 
WRIGH'T, his Guardian ad litem, 
Plaintiff a;nd Respondent, 
vs. 
J. R. DOWNING and J. WAYNE 
ELDREDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District In And For Salt Lake County, 
~ta~Utah F lo+.!)leif&.ltl~ogenson, Judge 
l -~·J 1- 1948 
l- ~ • GUSTIN & RICHARDS 
' ----~-------------co·-.R~:-u1~~-Atto.rneys for Defendants 
QLERK. S'JPHEM£ l> • and Appellants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
HENRY HAYWARD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. R. DOWNING and J. \VAYNE 
ELDREDGE, 
Defentkunts and AppeUants, 
and 
LYNN D. WRIGHT, a Minor, by JESSE 
WRIGH'T, his Guardian ad litem, 
Plaintiff (JJJ'bd Respondent, 
vs. 
J. R. DOWNING and J. WAYNE 
ELDREDGE, 
Defendants (JJJ'bd Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 





This is an action brought by the plaintiffs to recover 
damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the 
negligence of the defendants. These cases have previous-
ly been before this court. H1ayward v. Downimg, Wright 
v. Downing, 189 P. (2d) 442, decided on February 5, 
1948. In the previous appeal, both cases having been con-
solidated as in the instant case, this court held the trial 
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court to have been in error when it granted a motion of 
nonsuit and reversed the judgment of the trial court, re-
manding the cases for new trial. The two cases are now 
before this court upon appeal from judgments entered 
upon verdicts, in each instance in favor of the plaintiff. 
As pointed out by the court in its former decision, 
the two defendants were co-partners ·engaged in the 
promotion of wrestling matches for public ·exhibition in 
the Coliseum. Building at the State F'air Grounds in S'alt 
Lake City, of which building defendants. were •lessees. 
Seats for patrons extended in all directions from the 
stage, each row of seats being elevated slightly abo~e 
the row in front of it. On the east wall of the arena ther·e 
was a small platform or alcove about fifteen feet abo~e 
the floor and about five feet above the last row of seats, 
which were immediately be'low it. There were no ordinary 
devices by which customers could reach the platform or 
alcove, nor were there any accommodations provided 
for the g.eating of patrons thereon. Access to the plat-
form or alcove was gained by the person intending to sit 
thereon grasping an overhead iron beam with his hands 
and then swinging "Tarzan-like'' on to the platform. 
On the evening of April 26, 1946, the date of the ac-
cident, the two plaintiffs, with others, were sitting upon 
the platform watching the wrestling matches after having 
secured, as they testifi·ed, the express permission of the 
def·endant Downing to sit there. Both Hayward and 
Wright were sixteen years old at the time (Tr. pp. 114, 
219). During the progress of the last bout the platform 
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collapsed and the two plaintiffs fell to the floor of the 
building and were injured. Son1e six ·weeks before the 
accident one of the plaintiffs (Tr. pp. 154-155), and some 
of the companions of both of the plaintiffs, were sitting 
upon the platform when the weight of the same was in-
creased by the addition of two individuals, strangers to 
the boys. The platform sagged a few inches on this oc-
casion whereupon the strangers left the platform but 
the bo}-s remained on the same throughout thwt particular 
·evening and continued to sit there upon subsequent oc-
casions until the platform collapsed during the evening 
of the day in question. 
In the previous appeal the court held tha;t the plain-
tiffs occupied the status of "invitees" as to the plat-
form, the court ruling as follows: 
"B1-t·t when one ·Of thje· defendants expressly con-
sented that plaintiffs sit upon the platform, the 
invitation was broadened to include the platform, 
at least as to plaintiffs. We do not wish tro be un-
derstood as holding tha.t in .every case whene an 
invitee as to one part of the premises receives 
permissrvon to go ·upon ·another part of the prem-
iSies, he thereby becomes am invitee as to such 
seco.nd ~part. Our holding is limited strictly to 
the facts ·of this case-where an invitee as to one 
part of the premises, receives permission to go 
upon another part of the premises in furtherance 
of the object or purpose for which he was original-
ly invited upon the premises (in this case, to view 
the wrestling matches) he becomes an invitee as to 
such second part of the premises. As to other 
and different fact situations, we express no opin-
ion. '' (Italics ours). 
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In the re-trial, and properly so, the foregoing rule 
was accepted as the law of the case wHh the main factual 
situation centering about the question as to whether or 
not the defendants, and particularly the defendant Down-
ing, gave the boys expr,ess permission to sit upon ,the 
platform. Counsel in his opening statement (Tr. p. 110) 
stated that the proof would show that the boys sat on 
the platform "with the express consent of Mr. Downing 
that they could sit up there." The complaint in the 
Hayward case ( Tr. p. 2) aHeges that the plaintiff ''was 
directed by the defendant J. R. Downing to sit upon said 
s1t:age or platform,'' and in the Wright case the com-
plaint (Tr. p. 6) makes the same allegation, and which 
allegations were by the answers in ,each case denied (Tr. 
pp. 21-32, 34-3'6). In view of the errors to he hereafter 
assigned we think it important to keep in mind that an 
issue was raised as to whether or not the boys were sit-
1ing upon the platform with the exp.ress consent or per-
mission of the defendant, and particularly in view of the 
previous decision of this court. 
Aside from the genera1 denials, the answers in both 
case's, by way of affirmative defense, raise the issue of 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk. In thes,e 
particulars it is alleged that ther,e were ample seats pro-
vided for patrons but that nevertheless the plaintiffs 
voluntarily, and upon their own initiative, elected to and 
did sit upon the plaltform; that the platform was not a 
place provided for the s,eating of patrons nor for the 
seating of the plaintiffs but had been constructed by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
parties unknown to the defendants long prior to defend-
ants' lease of the premises for decorative purposes, and 
not at any tin1e intended for the purpose of seating or 
accon1n1odating patrons; that the plaintiffs gained access 
to the platform not by 1neans furnished by the defendants 
but by the unusual and unnatural method of being lifted 
by companions and drawing themselves up a portion of 
the way mth their arms and elbows ; that the plaintiffs 
at the time alleged in their respective complaints knew 
or in the exercise of reasonable car~e, caution and circum-
spection should have known the hazards, if any, involved 
in sitting or standing upon the platform, at which time 
the plaintiffs and each of :them were trespassers and not 
guests or invitees of the defendants and that the plain-
tiffs assumed all of the risks and hazards, if any, in con-
nection with their presence upon the platform. 
In support of the denials and affirmative allega-
tions of the answers, the defendant Downing testified 
that the boys had not asked for permission to sit on the 
platform; that the orders to everyone were to the effect 
that no one be permitted to sit there (Tr. pp. 356-357); 
that he did not know that the boys were sitting on the 
platform that e¥ening and that his orders ·were to keep 
them out of the alcove or off the platform at all times 
(Tr. p. 361). To the same effect was the testimony of 
the defendant Eldredge (Tr. p. 365), who also testified 
that after the p1latform collapsed two of the boys, in-
cluding the plaintiff Hayward had the appearance of 
having been drinking (Tr. p. 366). Ernes't E. Morris, a 
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spectator at the wrestling matches on the night in ques-
tion and at the time the floor collapsed, testified that he 
saw boys in the alcove and during the evening he heard 
a dis1turbance ''stamping of feet and one thing and an-
other" from the alcove (Tr. pp. 298-299). Walter J. 
Lewis, one of the defendants' employees, testified that 
he knew both Hayward and Wright and that on a prior 
occasion the boys had asked him for permission to sit in 
the alcove "I told them no, they couldn't do it. They 
said, 'We would see Mr. Downing'; and they went to see 
Mr. Downing and he positively said 'No'; and I a'lways 
talked to l\Ir. Downing, and he said, 'By all means keep 
them off from up there'." (Tr. p. 300); that the boys 
themselves had come to the conclusion that it was better 
for then1 not to get up there ( Tr. p. 306), and that people 
were not permitted to sit in the alcove at any time (Tr. 
p. 310). 
E. F. Adams, the ticket taker for the defendants dur-
ing the month of April1946 (Tr. p. 310), saw the Hay-
ward boy and another boy wrestling on the platform on 
the night in question and just as one of the bouts had 
finished one of the boys raised the other's hand as a 
token, and as the witness turned to get an officer to put 
the boys down he heard the crash (Tr. p. 311), and that 
people were never allowed to sit on the platform (Tr. 
p. 313). Arthur D. Murphy, a police officer for Salt Lake 
City for s'ome thirty-six years (Tr. p. 317) and privately 
employed by the defendants for policing the wrestling 
matches (Tr. p. 318), testified that he allowed no one 
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to sit on the platform and that on several occasions he 
got boys do,vn fron1 there, including the two plain-
tiffs (Tr. p. 318); that on the night of the accident and 
earlier in the evening before the platform collapsed he 
ordered Eugene Logan, one of the plaintiffs' companions, 
off the platform, who at the time was impudent and 
rude. Just before the crash the witness' attention was 
directed to the back of the building on account of some 
commotion and when he got back into the other portion 
of the building the platform had collapsed (Tr. p. 319). 
He testified that immediately after the accident he ob-
served the condition of the boys and observed that they 
(Christensen and Hayward, Tr. p. 324) had been drink-
ing (Tr. p. 320); that the boys had been ordered from the 
platform on other occasions and had always got down 
(Tr. p. 325). 
Joseph L. Sloan, an employee of Salt Lake City, a 
patron of the wrestling matches attending approximately 
ninety per cent of all of the events but not present on 
the night in question, testified to have personally 
"chased" people from the platform (Tr. p. 332). Vern 
F. Johnson, likewise a patron and at the arena on the 
night in question, saw Officer Murphy order the boys 
off the platform and then saw the boys get back again 
just before the platform collapsed (Tr. p. 336). Grant 
Pitts, a patron on the night in question, observed boys 
on the platform before the collapse arguing with Officer 
Murphy who told them to ge't down, which they did ('Tr. 
p. 339), and saw other boys or the same boys return to 
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the platform during an intermission (Tr. p. 340). Darwin 
Steadman, an usher, saw three or four boys on the plat-
form scuffling amongst themselves. The boys had been 
ordered down, the rule of the house being tha't no one 
could sit upon the platform and that it was the witness' 
duty to see to the seating of patrons (Tr. p. 343). Sidney 
Neslen, a student at the University of Utah and a patron 
of the wrestling matches, attempted to sit on the plat-
form sometime between the date of January 7, 1946 
and March 12th of that year when he was ordered down 
by a fireman and later by an usher. (Tr. p. 353). 
The Wright and Hayward boys were from Boun-
tiful and attended the wrestling matches with young 
companions from that place, calling themselves the 
"Bountiful crowd". The Bountiful boys were the only 
ones that testified to having obtained permission from 
Mr. Downing to sit on the platform. The trial court, not-
withstanding the testimony of disinterested witnesses 
as to what actually occurred on the night in question 
with respeet to the boys having been ordered off the plat-
form and with respect to the general practice in that re-
gard, refused to submit an interrogatory to the jury to 
be used in connection with the general verdict, the in-
terrogatory being so framed as to require a yes or no 
answer to the question "Did either one of the defend-
ants tell the plaintiff or his ·companions that he, the 
said plaintiff or said companions, might sit on the plat-
form or alcove on the night the accident occurred~" (Tr. 
p. 71). The trial court did not consistently submit the 
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question of the alleged express consent or permission for 
the boys to sit upon the platforn1, limited the application 
of the rule of contributory negligence and refused to 
submit the issue of assumption of risk and permitted, 
over objection, plaintiffs' counsel to argue the respon-
sibility of a proprietor who maintains an attractive nuis-
ance on his premises, a theory not contemplated by the 
pleadings or proper from the proof. These, in the main, 
are the questions to be determined upon this appeal. 
STATEMENTS OF ERRORS RELIED UPON 
1. The court erred in not submitting to the jury the 
question of assumption of risk (Requested Instructions, 
9 Tr. p. 68; 10 Tr. p. 69; 11 Tr. p. 70; all refused. Excep-
tion p. 389) . 
2. The court erred in not consistently instructing 
that plaintiffs had the burden of proving express consent 
to sit where they did (Requested Instruction 7 refused 
Tr. p. 66. Exception Tr. p. 388). 
3. The court erred in its instruction on contributory 
negligence and in refusing to instruct as requested (In-
struction Tr. p. 50; Requested instructions 3 Tr. p. 62; 4 
Tr. p. 63. Exception Tr. p. 388). 
4. The court erred in failing to instruct on defend-
ants' theory that consent or permission was not given to 
the plaintiffs to sit where they did (Requested Instruc-
tion 8 Tr. p. 67. Exception Tr. p. 388). 
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5. The court erred in refusing to submit a speciai 
interrogatory to the jury, to be returned in connection 
with its general verdict, inquiring as to whether or not 
either one of the defendants told the plaintiff or his com-
panions that he, the said plaintiff, or his companions 
might sit on the platform or alcove on the night the ac-
cident occurred (Requested Instruction 12 Tr. p. 71. Ex-
ception Tr. p. 389). 
6. The court erred in permitting plaintiffs' coun-
sel to argue before the jury to the effect that it was 
negligence on the part of the defendants to permit the 
opening in the wall known as the alcove to remain there 
as an inducement for boys of the ages of fourteen, fif-
teen and sixteen to sit, and upon being so requested to 
fail and refuse to instruct the jury that that was not an 
issue in the case (Argument, request and exception Tr. 
pp. 384-386). 
7. That the court erred in overruling and denying 
defendants' motions for new trial (Motions Tr. pp. 80-
83, 390-395. Ruling Tr. p. 396). 
8. The verdict and judgment thereon in each of 
the cases is not supported by but is contrary to the evi-
dence. 
ARGUMENT 
The assignments of error and the various proposi-
tions involved group themselves for argument as follows: 
1. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed On The 
Hefense Of Assumption Of Risk. 
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From the fact that the boys, according to their testi-
mony, requested permission from ~Ir. Downing on each 
evening that they attended the bouts to sit in the alcove, 
it can reasonably be inferred that they were conscious 
of possible hazards in so doing. The Bountiful boys, and 
particularly the plaintiff Hay·ward, were on the plat-
form and in the alcove several weeks before the accident 
when the floor of the same "bent in a 'little" (Tr. p. 154) 
when additional weight was added. 
'' Q. But it was the floor that started to give way 
in one corner; is that it¥ 
A. Yes." (Tr. pp. 154-155). 
The witness Lewis testified: 
'' Q. Did the boys ever tell you Mr. Downing had 
told them they could, or couldn't sit up there¥ 
A. They agreed not to go up there, after I told 
them.*** 
A. Well, they oonte to the conclusion it was bet-
ter for them not to get up there. They felt as 
though it wasn't safe at the time. They 
weren't the only boys we had to keep down. 
And finally we had to go to Mr. Murphy and 
have Mr. Murphy come and help make them 
get off there.'' ( Tr. pp. 305-306). 
The witness also testified: 
'' Q. Did I understand you to say that the boys 
asked you if they could talk to Mr. Downing¥ 
A. Yes, they asked me: I told them to see Mr. 
Downing. 
Q. What happened after that¥ 
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A. I wouldn't let them up there. They said, 'It 
is funny you won't let us up there'. They said 
'We got word from Mr. Downing'. I said, 
'By all m·eans boys, it is not safe'." ('Tr. p. 
305). 
Both answers (Tr. pp. 31-36) raised the issue that 
the plaintiffs assumed the risks arrd hazards, if any, in 
connection with their presence upon the platform. Speci-
fic instructions on that theory were requested as follows: 
'·'DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO.8. 
You are instructed that, if you find from the 
evidence in this case that the alcove or platform, 
where plaintiff was sitting or standing, was con-
structed for some purpose other than for patrons 
to sit or stand upon and that plaintiff was not 
given permission to sit there, and you further 
find that plaintiff was injured by reason of some 
matter not known to the defendants, or either of 
them, your verdict shall he for the defendants and 
against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF ACTION." 
(Tr. p. 67). 
"DEFENDANT'S' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO.9. 
You are instructed that, if you find that the 
.plaintiff did not obtain permission to occupy the 
alcove or platform where he was sitting, then you 
are instructed that he assumed all risk of injuries 
arising from the use of the platform or alcove, and, 
therefore, your verdict shall be for the defend-
ants and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION." (Tr. p. 68). 
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''DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
xo. 10. 
You are instructed that if you find from the 
evidence in this case that the alcove or platform 
where plaintiff was sitting or standing was con-
structed for some purpose other than for patrons 
to sit or stand on, and that plaintiff was not 
directed to sit or stand there but did so of his 
own choice, he assumes the risk which may attach 
to such place, and if his injuries were caused by 
reason of the fact that said place was not properly 
constructed for patrons to sit and stand on, then 
your verdict shall be in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF AC-
TION." (Tr. p. 69). 
"DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO. 11. 
You are instructed that if one voluntarily 
takes a place, which is more dangerous and 
hazardous than the place or location generally 
provided for patrons, he assumes the risk in-
cidental to such hazards and if his injuries are 
caused by reason of his taking the more hazardous 
place, then your verdict should be in favor of the 
defendants and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE 
OF ACTION." (Tr. p. 70). 
The foregoing instructions were refused. All that the 
court said on the subje·ct was in connection with its 
Instruction No. 1 where it summarized the issues (Tr. 
p. 44) omitting any reference to the subject in its further 
instructions. 
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The distinction between contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk is pointed out in the case of TayZor 
v. B01mberger Electric R. Co., 62 Utah 552, 220 P. '695:, 
where the court stated: 
H The questions, therefore, for this court to 
determine are: Did plaintiff's acts and conduct, 
as stated by himself, constitute contributory negli-
gence per se, and did he assume the risk as matter 
of law~ In this connection we desire to state that 
the question of assumption of risk is here dis-
cussed for the reason that in this case that issue 
was presented by the pleadings and the district 
court submitted it to the jury in connection with 
the issue of contributory negligenoe. Anything 
that is herein said on the question of assumption 
of risk is limited to the facts and circumstances 
of this case, and we do not now pass upon the 
question of whether, as betwe,en a common car-
rier and a passenger, that defense is ordinarily 
available to the carrier and, if so, to what ex-
tent. 
As pointed out by this court in Kuchenmeister 
v. L.A. & S. L. R. R. Co., 52 Utah, 116, 172 Pac. 
725, there is a clear distinction between contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of r!sk. It has, 
however, also often been held that under certain 
circumstances the same acts or conduct may make 
one guilty of contributory negligence and also give 
rise to the def,ense of assumption of risk. 
The undisputed facts and circumstances, ac-
cording to the authorities to which we shall here-
inafter refer, clearly bring this case within the 
doctrine just stated. In view of plaintiff's state-
ments, there is not a shadow of doubt that he 
acted with full knowledge of all the circumstances 
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surrounding him and that all that he did in the 
premises was done deliberately and with full ap-
preciation of the danger to which he exposed him-
self. True, he Inay not have anticipated the lurch-
ing or swaying of the cars; hence it is contended 
that because the lurching of the cars was due to 
the defendant's negligence plaintiff did not as-
sume the risk. It no doubt is true that under or-
dinary circumstances a passenger will not be held 
to have assumed a risk arising out of a carrier's 
negligence. In this case, however, the circum-
stances are extraordinary. Here the defendant 
had provided the plaintiff with a reasonably safe 
place in which he could have he·en safely carried 
to his destination. He, of his own volition and 
through intelligent choice, left the place where 
he was safe and chose one that was extremely 
dangerous. It might just as weH be con tended 
that although plaintiff had ·chosen to ride on the 
trucks under the cars and was injured by reason 
of the lurching of the cars, his conduct did not 
constitute contributory negligence, and that he 
did not assume the risk, since the lurching was 
caused by reason of a defect in the track which 
the defendant, in the exercise of that high degree 
of care which the law imposed on it, should have 
prevented.'' 
The Taylor case, supra, is not a case involving the 
relationship of master and servant, in which class of 
cases the doctrine of assumption of risk is most frequent-
ly applied. That the doctrine is applicable in an action 
between persons not master and servant or not having 
relations by contract with each other, where the plaintiff 
knew and appreciated the danger and voluntarily put 
himself in the way of it, is recognized in the 'Taylor case 
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and in the case of Edwards v. 8outhern Railway Com-
pany, 169 So. 715, 106 A.L.R. 1133 (Ala.) where the court 
stated: 
''In the case of McGeever v. 0 'Byrne, 203 
Ala. 266, 269, 82 So. 508, the phrase 'assumption 
of risk' is fully considered, and it is there noted 
that the expression is som-etimes loosely applied 
to cases where there was no contractual relation 
between the parties. 'The rule declared is, that 
it must be confined to cases where the plaintiff 
knew and appreciated the danger assumed, and 
with such knowledge and appreciation voluntarily 
put himself in the way of it.'' 
The uncontradicted testimony is that for some period 
of time the plaintiffs knew that the platform would sag 
or become loosened by reason of weight placed upon it; 
that they had been expressly warned that it was not safe 
and that they had concluded that it was not a safe or 
proper place for them to sit. Applying the doctrine of 
assumption of risk, and in view of the uncontroverted 
testimony, then it would follow that as a matter of law 
the plaintiffs should not be entitled to recover. At least 
the issue became one that the jury should have consid-
ered upon proper instruction stating and setting forth 
the law applicable to the facts in issue. This the court 
did not do. That it should have done so is fundamental, 
as stated in Herndon v. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 6'5, 95 
P. 646: 
"Instructions should in all cases apply the 
law to the existing facts and circumstances, and 
in cases of negligence, where the duty varies with 
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the conditions, a mere general statement of the 
law with regard to the duty generally imposed is, 
if possible, worse than not to instruct at all." 
The mention of assumption of risk in outlining the 
issues, in Instruction No. 1, the lack of reference to it in 
Instruction No. 2 where it is stated without reference to 
the particular defense of assumption of risk ''the de-
fendants have the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence the contributory negligence, if any, of 
the plaintiff", and no further reference throughout the 
instructions brings the case, we believe, within the rule 
announced by this court in JJfartin v. Sheffield, 189 P. 
(2d) 127, decided February 3, 1948, where the eourt held: 
"Such instruction, uneluciated in any other 
part of the charge, might well be construed by 
the jury to mean that though the jury found negli-
gence on the part of plaintiff which proximately 
contributed to the accident, nev·ertheless plaintiff 
was entitled to a verdict. 
Viewing the instructions as a whole, we con-
clude that the court failed, although requested by 
defendant to do so, to advis·e the jury as to the 
effect of alleged negligence on the part of plain-
tiff should it find that such negligence proximate-
ly contributed to her own injuries. This was preju-
dicial error.'' 
2. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed On The 
Defense Of Contributory Negligence. 
The court refused Defendants' Requested Instruc-
tion No.3 (Tr. p. 62), which reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that, if you find that 
the plaintiff by his acts or conduct other than 
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1nerely sitting upon the platform caused, or in 
any manner, no matter how slight, contributed to 
the accident, he cannot recover and your verdict 
must be in favor of the defendants NO CAUSE 
OF ACTION." 
The court modified Defendants' Requested Instruc-
tion No. 4 (Tr. p. 63) which, as requested, read as fol-
lows: 
''You are instructed that if you find from the 
evidence there was scuffling, wrestling, or playing 
on the alcove or platform, and that such ·conduct 
on the part of plaintiff or his companions caused 
or contributed to the giving away of the alcove 
or platform floor, then you are instructed that 
your verdict must be in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF AC-
TION.'' 
The modified request is found in Instruction No. 7 
(Tr. p. 50) as follows: 
''You are instructed that if you find by a 
preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff en-
gaged in scuffling, or wrestling on the alcove or 
platform, and that such oonduct on the part of 
~plaintiff was what 1a re1aS1ovroably prudent pers1on 
would not have done under the facts and circum-
st,ances then and there existitng and proximately 
caused or contributed to the giving away of the 
alcove or platform floor, then you are instructed 
that your verdict must be in favor of the defend-
ants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action." 
The vice of the requested instruction given as modified 
is the language inserted by the court, emphasized above 
by italics. 
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The theory upon which the cases were t~ied, meas-
ured by the law of the case as announced in the former 
appeal, would not permit the plaintiffs any greater lati-
tude under the status of invitees than that of sitting upon 
the platform for the purpose of viewing the wrestling 
bouts. To permit the jury to measure the plaintiffs' con-
duct while on the platform under the rule of conduct of 
that of a ''reasonably prudent person'' while doing some-
thing beyond the express permission granted goes beyond 
the law of the case and permits something more than the 
express permission contemplated. As the instruction was 
requested the abuse of the express privilege allegedly 
granted, making the plaintiffs invitees rather than tres-
passers, was stressed, the abuse being that of scuffling, 
wrestling or play on the platform; then that conduct in 
view of the circumstances of the case, if su~h conduc-t 
caused or contributed to the giving way of the platform, 
would be contributory negligence. And indeed it might 
well be argued that such conduct would in turn remove 
the plaintiffs from the status of invitees. In any event, 
as a matter of law, the jury should have been instructed 
that if in fact the boys were scuffling, wrestling or play-
ing on the platform and that that conduct caused or con-
tributed to the giving away of the platform, they were 
guilty of contributory negligence, hut the court went fur-
ther and permitted the jury by the instruction given to 
apply the reasonably prudent person rule notwithstand-
ing the limitations of the ,express permission the defend-
ants allegedly gave, which in turn this court has held 
to be the only thing that placed the plaintiffs in the 
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status of invitees. The instruction as given contains the 
same fundamental objection as the instruction in the 
Martin case, supra, and that is it "might well be con-
strued by the jury to mean that though the jury found 
negligence on the part of plaintiff which proximately 
contributed to the accident, nevertheless plaintiff was 
entitled to a verdict.'' 
3. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed On The 
Question Of "Express" Consent Or Permission, The Law Of 
The Case. 
In the previous appeal and as heretofore pointed out 
the court held: ''But when one of the defendants express-
ly consented that plaintiffs sit upon the platform, the 
invitation was broadened to include the platform, at 
least as to plaintiffs.'' In Instruction No. 2 the court 
omitted the expression "express permission", likewise 
in Instructions No. 4 and 5. The only place where the 
term ''express permission'' was used is found in that 
portion of Instruction No. 7 which reads : 
"You are instructed that before the plaintiff 
can recover in this action he must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was given 
express permission to sit upon the place where 
he says he was sitting on the night of the accident. 
It is not sufficient that the plaintiff, or his com-
panions, sat on the platform as a matter of cus-
tom or practice, or of their own volition, or even 
with the knowledge of the def-endants, or either 
of them, and if, therefore, you find that the plain-
tiff was not given express permission to sit where 
he did, then your verdict shall be in favor of the 
defendants and against. the plaintiff, no cause of 
action." (Tr. p. 50). 
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The court refused Defendants' Requested Instruc-
tion X o. 7, which reads as follows : 
''You are instructed that a request by the 
plaintiff to sit where he did is not the sam,e as a 
direction to sit there. The plaintiff, before he can 
recover in this action, must show that he was 
directed to sit where the accident occurred.'' (Tr. 
p. 66). 
The plaintiffs testified to sitting upon the plat-
fonn on a number of previous occasions and having seen 
others do likewise. Whether or not express permission 
was obtained on previous occasions on behalf of the 
plaintiffs and others is debatable, but the court should 
not have been uncertain in the use of the expression 
''consent or pennission'' in view of the previous holding 
of the court, which holding centered the status of in-
vitee about the term "express" permission. 
In Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 39 
Utah 236, 115 P. 967, the court holds: 
''The former decision became and is the law 
of the case, and this court, as well as the litigants, 
are bound thereby.'' 
From the whole of the charge it cannot help but ap-
pear that the court disregarded the significance of the 
term ''express" consent and failed to give it proper 
emphasis consistently as the law of the case throughout 
the instructions. 
4. The Court Failed To Give Any Emphasis To The 
Denials Of Plaintiffs' Contention. 
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Requested Instruction No. 8, which the court re-
fused, was as follows: 
"You are instructed, if you find from the 
evidence in this case that the alcove or platform, 
where plaintiff was sitting or standing, was con-
structed for some purpose other than for patrons 
to sit or stand upon and that plaintiff was not 
given permission to sit there, and you further 
find that plaintiff was injured by reason of some 
matter not known to the defendants, or either of 
them, your verdict shall be for the defendants 
and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF AC-
TION." (Tr. p. 67). 
The requested instruction was on the theory that 
the jury might well disregard as unreliable the testimony 
of the Bountiful boys and find that the express per-
mission or consent relied upon was not in fact extended 
to them, in which event then the court as a matter of 
law could say that the evidence fell short of establishing 
liability as against a trespasser or mere licensee, requir-
ing the verdict of no cause of action. That theory, by 
way of instruction, was not separately stated nor clearly 
pointed out to the jury. What suggestion was made on 
that score was hidden in other instructions and comingled 
with other matters so as to result in a situation where 
the defense of denial was for all practical purposes en-
tirely unelucidated in the charge, the criticism that the 
court found with the charge in the Martin case, supra. 
Instruction No. 1 states that the defendants in each 
case denied ''the said allegations of each of the plain-
tiffs", the only reference to denials in that instruction. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Instruction X o. 2 states that the plaintiff has the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant Downing gave permission to sit in the alcove. 
Instruction No. 3 defines burden of proof and prepond-
erance of the evidence. Instructions No. 1, 2 and 3 are 
so-called stock instructions. Instruction No. 4 emphasizes 
the fact that defendants admit the plaintiffs paid an 
admission fee to see the wrestling matches, and the plain-
tiffs contention that they had the permission of the de-
fendant Downing to sit in the alcove, stating ''this the 
defendants deny". The instruction then proceeds to state 
that if it is found from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the plaintiffs did have permission, then they were 
guests and the defendants owed the duty of exercising 
reasonable care. The instruction unnecessarily empha-
sizes the payment of an admission fee, emphasizes the 
guest relationship and minimizes, so far as language 
by implication can do so, the significance of the defend-
ants' denial that permission was given. Instruction No. 
5 is subject to the same criticism while Instruction No. 
6 states that if the plaintiffs chose to sit at a place not 
ordinarily provided for patrons, and a place where they 
were not given permission to sit, the defendants would 
owe them no duty of inspection or otherwise to keep the 
place in a safe condition for the seating of patrons, but 
the instruction does not go further and state the legal 
effect of the want of permission so far as the ~law ap-
plicable to the facts in the instant cases is concerned. 
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Instruction No. 7 is as close as the court came to 
stating the legal effect of the lack or want of express 
permission for the boys to sit where they did, but it will 
be noticed that several independent subjects are treated 
in the one instruction. In fact the court included in In-
struction No. 7 nearly all of the few requests that it gave 
on defendants' theory. In fairness we do not believe it 
can be said that the court gave proper emphasis to the 
significance of the want or lack of express permission, 
even in Instruction No. 7. None of the other instructions 
have anything whatsoever to do with the matter. 
5. The Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Submitting 
The Sp·ecial Interrogatory To Test The Gene~ral Verdict. 
By Requested Instruction No. 12 (Tr. p. 71) the 
defendants asked the court to submit the fO'llowing: 
''You are instructed that in connection with 
your general v·erdict in this case, whether it be 
for the plaintiff or whether it be for the defend-
ants, that you are required to answer the follow-
ing question or interrogatory: 
Question: Did either one of the defendants 
tell the plaintiff or his companions that he, the 
said plaintiff, or his companions, might sit on 
the platform or alcove on the night the accident 
occurred1· 
Answer:---
The foregoing interrogatory shall be an-
swer·ed either yes or no, and 6 of the jurors con-
curring may make answer to the interrogatory by 
the foreman.'' 
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We appreciate that under Section 104-25-2 · U.C.A. 
1943 the granting of a request such as the above is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. The opinion of 
this court in the formal appeal makes the matter of ex-
press consent the outstanding and controlling fact in the 
whole case. As we have heretofore pointed out, the in-
structions of the court do not emphasize the matter of 
the existence or lack of express consent and the fact that 
the trial court refused the special interrogatory em-
phasizes the misconception that the court must have had 
of the previous ruling, the law of the case. Special in-
terrogatories and findings to test the sufficency of the 
general verdict should be encouraged and the useful pur-
pose thereof in the administration of justice is apparent 
in a great number of cases but in the instant matter and 
where the appellate court has reversed and remanded for 
new trial, pointing out a controlling factual situation, 
most certainly it would be an abuse of discretion, where 
discretion is permitted, for the court not to give proper 
emphasis to the same. It can well be said that the con-
trolling factual situation was camouflaged by a mass of 
verbiage concerning maters incidental to the crux of the 
situation. We submit that under the circumstances it 
was an abuse of discretion not to submit the requested 
interrogatory, and here again we call attention to the 
fact that there was testimony of severa'l disinterested 
witnesses on the main point in issue. 
6. The Sugg,estion By Way Of Argument Of An At-
tractive Nuisance Was Prejudicial. 
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The record on this point is as follows: 
"MR. GUSTIN: First, your Honor, might we 
make a record of what occurred, during the 
closing argument of the plaintiff, the argu-
ment being made by Judge Tanner. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. GUSTIN: Where he stated, in substance 
and effect, that it was negligence on the part I 
of the defendants to permit the opening on 
the wall known as the alcove, to remain there 
as an inducement for boys of the age of 
fourteen years, or thereabouts, to sit. I be-
lieve I have stated the substance of what Mr. 
Tanner stated. 
·THE COURT : That in substance is right, is it 
not~ 
MR. TANNER: Fourteen, fifteen and sixteen. 
MR. GUSTIN: All right, fourteen, fifteen and 
sixteen. 
And that thereupon, the defendants, by 
·counsel, asked the court to instruct the jury 
that that element was not one of the issues 
in the case, and the court stated that the jury 
had been instructed as to the elements in 
the case, and that that was sufficient. I think 
that is the substance. 
THE COURT: I believe I said, Mr. Gustin, if 
my recollection is right, that the issues in 
the case were set forth in the instructions, 
and that the jury were the sole judges of the 
facts, and the court would let it stand at 
that.'' ( Tr. pp. 384-385). 
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In Jensen v. Utah Ry. Oo., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349, 
it was held: 
'·In this jurisdiction, arguments to the jury 
are made after, and not before, the charge of the 
court. 
For purposes of arguments to the jury, coun-
sel, of course, are required to accept the charge 
and yield obedience to it, and are not permitted 
to argue against it. So, when counsel in effect 
argued that one of the parents was negligent, 
whether for the purpose of showing that such 
negligence was the sole and proximate cause or 
a concurring cause of the injury, he, because of 
the charge, was not within his rights, though the 
argument may have been entirely in good faith. 
We of course recognize a wide scope and great 
liberality in arguments of causes to a jury. But 
here the court clearly withheld from the jury all 
questions of negligence of the parents for any and 
all purposes. In such case, on timely objections, 
as here made, to permit arguments, either direct-
ly or indirectly, with respect to such questions, 
tends to mislead the jury. While ·the court eli-
minated some of the argument, he ought to have 
eliminated the whole of it, bearing on the sub-
ject, and ,erred in not doing so.'' 
In Kerby v. Oregon Short Line R. Oo., 264 P. 377 
(Idaho), the court said : 
''An attorney should confine his arguments 
to the issues and the evidence adduced, and to in-
ferences which can legitimately he drawn there-
from, and not go outside the record in an effort 
to prejudi·ce the rights of the opposing party.'' 
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The prejudicial effect of counsel's statement is 
readily apparent in a case of this kind. To suggest that 
the attractive nuisance theory of liability exists in the 
instant matter is to depart entirely from plaintiffs' 
theory that they were not trespassers but were invitees. 
'There was nothing in the proof nor is there anything 
in the pleadings that would justify counsel's statement. 
What he said was c;learly beyond the theory of the case 
and the instructions of the court. The statement was un-
doubtedly calculated to prejudice the jury against the 
proprietor of wrestling bouts who had accepted an ad-
mission charge. To be able to say without admonishment 
that the defendants were negligent in permitting the 
opening in the wall, lmown as the alcove, to remain there 
as an inducement for boys sixteen years of age and 
under to sit could not help but confuse the jury as to 
the true issues involved. The trial court was given an 
opportunity to instruct the jury that the matter sug-
gested was not an element in the case and for the court 
to disregard the request and to state that the issues in 
the case were as set forth in the instructions, and that 
the jury were the sole judges of the facts, could not 
possibly have cured the situation. The effect of the state-
ment, coupled with the failure of the court to act upon 
being requested, was to permit counsel to go outside of 
the issues of the case, to depart from the instructions of 
the court and to suggest a theory of absolute liability, and 
we contend thereby that prejudice is to be presumed. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the sympathy that one might have for 
the unf~rtunate situation of the plaintiffs, the defend-
ants were entitled to have their side of the case fairly 
and impartially presented to the jury with the law ap-
plicable thereto. \Vhen one considers the instructions as 
a whole, the failure of the trial court to crystallize the 
one controlling fact that was in issue through the medium 
of the special interrogatory, the over-reaching of counsel 
in his argument into a realm of absolute liability without 
restraint in a case where by the very nature of it, emo-
tions and prejudice play such an important role, then 
we say that the errors committed, a:ll added together, re-
sult in a situation where a fair trial was not had on mat-
ters peculiarly within the province and under the con-
trol of the court itself. The judgments appealed from 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN & RICHARDS, 
Attoff"neys {ior Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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